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In an article published several years ago, I examined the financing dimension of private choice and 
proposed a framework for analyz-
ing Congress’s taxing and spending 
decision-making processes. Although 
issues other than health care reform 
provided the impetus for the article, the 
framework developed there provides 
a broader perspective from which to 
consider the taxing power portion 
of Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in 
National Federation of Independent Busi-
ness v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. — (2012).
The article’s abstract stated in part as 
follows:
Congress coordinates its taxing 
and spending decisions through 
the budget process, collectively 
determining what will be financed 
and performed through govern-
ment and what will be left to 
private choice. The courts generally 
defer to the taxing and spend-
ing decisions made by Congress. 
Nevertheless, in the process of 
developing this highly deferential 
approach, the U.S. Supreme Court 
historically has drawn distinctions 
between taxes and other means 
of paying for or regulating the 
production of goods and services. 
Although it can be quite difficult 
to distinguish “taxes” or “revenue 
raising” from “user fees,” “prices,” or 
“penalties,” they are not constitu-
tionally interchangeable. When the 
Court has interpreted express limi-
tations on Congress’s taxing power, 
it has drawn distinctions similar to 
those drawn in the privatization 
literature between “individual” 
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and “collective” financing. These 
doctrinal distinctions reflect the 
democratic values inherent in 
Congress’s taxing and spending 
powers.
As explained in greater detail in the 
article, private choice can be financed 
individually, that is, paid for by an 
individual’s own resources, facilitated by 
general tax reduction and by deregula-
tion. Alternatively, private choice can 
be financed collectively by using tax 
revenues (or government-borrowed 
funds) to pay for privately provided 
goods and services. The tendency in 
political debate to conflate those two 
forms of financing, as well as the failure 
to distinguish between financing and 
performance, obscures important 
decisions about private choice and 
the government’s role in managing 
or monitoring collectively financed 
activities.
Defining Public Values: 
Congress’s Taxing and Spending 
Powers
In interpreting express constitutional 
limits on the taxing power, the Supreme 
Court historically has analyzed the 
government’s taxing power in relation 
to its financing function. Differences 
between collective and individual 
financing thus underlie certain distinc-
tions important in constitutional 
analysis. The cases suggest, for example, 
that express constitutional limitations 
on the taxing power are enforced when 
Congress is engaged in general “revenue 
raising” as opposed to collecting fees 
in exchange for goods or services. That 
is, an imposition may be a “tax” when 
funds are collected from private parties 
for a “public” purpose.
In addition, the Court has drawn 
historically significant distinctions 
between “taxes” and “penalties” for 
regulatory violations. In the early part 
of the last century, taxes were upheld 
as valid revenue measures rather than 
prohibited regulatory “penalties” if they 
were unconditional taxes, achieving 
their regulatory effects through their 
rate structure; or if their regulatory 
provisions bore a “reasonable relation” 
to their enforcement as a revenue 
measure.
When this doctrinal distinction 
became less salient after the Court’s 
view of the commerce power expanded 
during the New Deal period, the 
Court generally tended to treat tax 
provisions producing revenue as 
constituting valid “revenue” measures. 
After adopting a more expansive view 
of national legislative powers, the Court 
never again held a federal tax to be an 
impermissible effort by Congress to 
impose regulatory standards outside the 
scope of its other enumerated powers. 
Because taxes imposed as regulatory 
penalties in the past had been upheld as 
sufficiently necessary and proper under 
the Commerce Clause, the relationship 
between the taxing power and other 
legislative powers received no serious 
discussion or reconsideration until the 
Court’s decision last June in Sebelius.
A Functional Approach to the 
Taxing Power
The portion of Chief Justice Roberts’ 
opinion applying a “functional” 
approach to the taxing power is fully 
consistent with those earlier cases. 
The Chief Justice wrote for the Court 
that regardless of the label applied by 
Congress, the “shared responsibility” 
exaction imposed on the uninsured is a 
valid “tax” for constitutional purposes as 
opposed to an impermissible regulatory 
“penalty.” In reaching that conclusion, 
Chief Justice Roberts applied three 
“practical” factors considered by the 
Court in 1922 when it invalidated the 
“Child Labor Tax” in Drexel Furniture. 
Decided when the Commerce Clause 
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was thought not to permit federal 
regulation of child labor, Drexel Furni-
ture held that an excise tax imposed 
on employers for noncompliance with 
child labor restrictions was an improper 
regulatory device rather than a valid 
revenue measure.
In distinguishing the statute at issue 
in Drexel Furniture from the individual 
mandate, Chief Justice Roberts pointed 
out that unlike the “penalty” of ten 
percent of the company’s net income 
for employing children, the shared 
responsibility exaction imposes a 
relatively low level of burden on those 
without insurance (usually less than the 
cost of insurance and, by statute, never 
more than that cost). Sebelius, slip op. 
at 35. In addition, although the Child 
Labor Tax was imposed on only those 
who knowingly broke the law, the 
individual mandate of the health care 
legislation contains no scienter or mens 
rea requirement, a feature typical of 
punitive statutes. Id. Finally, he observed 
that although the Child Labor Tax was 
enforced in part by the Department 
of Labor, the shared responsibility 
“payment is collected solely by the 
IRS through the normal means of 
taxation—except that the Service is 
not allowed to use those means most 
suggestive of a punitive sanction, such as 
criminal prosecution.” Id. at 36 (empha-
sis in original).
After concluding that the shared 
responsibility exaction is a “tax,” Chief 
Justice Roberts then went on to analyze 
whether the “tax” complied with other 
express constitutional limitations on the 
taxing power. Although the Supreme 
Court has generally accorded Congress 
a presumption of validity in the exercise 
of its taxing power, express constitu-
tional limitations on the taxing power 
include the uniformity requirement 
imposed on indirect taxes, the prohibi-
tion against the taxation of exports, 
and the apportionment requirement 
imposed on direct taxes. In addition, 
under the Origination Clause, all bills 
for “raising revenue” must originate 
in the House of Representatives. The 
taxing power is also limited by the 
crosscutting limitations of the Bill of 
Rights, which can apply to any exercise 
of congressional power.
Chief Justice Roberts rejected the 
argument asserted by the plaintiffs that 
the shared responsibility payment was 
a “direct” tax subject to the apportion-
ment requirement. He first observed 
that a tax on going without health 
insurance was not within any recog-
nized category of “direct” tax. It is not a 
“capitation” and “also plainly not a tax 
on the ownership of land or personal 
property.” Id. at 41.
He then went on to explain why it 
was not troubling to permit Congress to 
impose a tax for not doing something 
when it had held that the Commerce 
Clause “did not permit Congress 
to regulate those who abstain from 
commerce.” Id. at 41. According to 
the Chief Justice, three considerations 
allayed any potential concern. First, “and 
most importantly, it is abundantly clear 
the Constitution does not guarantee 
that individuals may avoid taxation 
through inactivity,” with the express 
contemplation of a capitation tax by 
the Constitution. He then pointed out 
that Congress’s use of the Taxing Clause 
“to encourage buying something is, 
by contrast, not new,” citing provisions 
related to the home mortgage interest 
deduction and certain higher educa-
tion tax incentives. Id. at 42. Second, 
although Congress’s ability to use its 
taxing power to influence conduct is 
not without its limits, the shared respon-
sibility payment “passed muster” within 
the “strictest limits” applied by the 
Court. “More often, and more recently,” 
he observed, the Court had “declined to 
closely examine the regulatory motive 
or effect of revenue raising measures.” 
Id. He noted, “we need not here decide 
the precise point at which an exaction 
becomes so punitive that the taxing 
power does not authorize it.” Id. at 43. 
Third, imposition of a tax “nonetheless 
leaves an individual with a lawful choice 
to do or not to do a certain act, so long 
as he is willing to pay a tax levied on 
that choice.” The only thing they may 
not lawfully do “is not buy health insur-
ance and not pay the resulting tax.” Id. at 
44 & n.11.
In the past, courts have offered limited 
additional guidance with regard to the 
meaning of the term “revenue” in other 
constitutional contexts, distinguishing 
between revenue measures and special 
assessments or user fees. In interpreting 
the Origination Clause, for example, the 
Supreme Court has included revenues 
intended for the general support of 
government but not special assessments 
designed to fund specific programs 
through fines or fees. For purposes of 
interpreting the Export Clause, which 
prohibits the taxation of exports from 
the states, the Supreme Court has simi-
larly distinguished between prohibited 
taxes on exports and permissible user 
fees tied to specific benefits, services, 
or facilities. Thus, in defining revenue 
provisions, both Origination Clause and 
Export Clause cases draw distinctions 
between individually financed “user 
fees” and collectively financed “general 
revenues.”
Federalism and the Spending 
Power
On the spending side, Congress 
also has had a great deal of latitude 
historically in determining whether a 
particular expenditure serves “public” 
purposes, that is, whether the spending 
is in pursuit of the “general welfare.” 
Under the spending power cases such 
as South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 
(1987), objectives not thought to be 
within the enumerated legislative 
powers “may nevertheless be attained 
through the use of the spending power 
and the conditional grant of federal 
funds.” Id. at 207. In Dole the Court 
adopted a multi-part test to determine 
whether federal spending conditions 
are constitutional. Although the Court 
also noted that Congress cannot enact 
spending conditions to induce the 
states to engage in unconstitutional 
acts or to coerce states into actions rather 
than offering them a choice, no clear 
limiting principle on the spending 
power had emerged under the Court’s 
subsequent federalism decisions until 
its decision on the Medicaid portions 
of the health care reform legislation. 
In Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts 
observed that the threatened loss of all 
of the state’s existing federal Medicaid 
funding if a state declined to comply 
with the legislation’s expanded Medic-
aid coverage provisions was coercive, 
continued on next page
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contrary to federalism, and thus, an 
impermissible spending condition. Slip 
op. at 45-58. Finding the Medicaid 
provision to be severable from the rest 
of the legislation, the Court remedied 
the constitutional violation by preclud-
ing the Secretary from withdrawing 
existing Medicaid funds for failure to 
comply with the requirements set out 
in the expansion. Id. at 55-58.
Taxing and Spending: The 
Financing and Performance of 
Private Choice
The combined impact of the Chief 
Justice Roberts’ analysis in Sebelius of 
the taxing and spending powers suggest 
that the Court will continue to defer to 
Congress’s broad authority to enact tax 
provisions with either revenue-raising 
or revenue-losing effects. Constitution-
ally required enactment procedures, 
including bicameralism and present-
ment, provide democratic legitimacy for 
Congress’s taxing and spending deci-
sions. Of course, such decision making 
procedures apply to all legislation, 
whether Congress is raising or lowering 
taxes, enacting targeted tax incentives, 
or appropriating funds. The fostering 
of other democratic values, including 
transparency and accountability, depends 
upon the availability of information 
about and public understanding of those 
decisions.
As I argued in my earlier article, 
general tax reduction and targeted tax 
incentives, both ways of advancing 
privatization goals, differ in approaches 
to financing. General tax reduction 
results in more individual financing 
of goods and services. Targeted tax 
incentives, on the other hand, like the 
home mortgage interest deduction and 
higher education tax credits, subsidize 
certain legislatively favored activities, 
and therefore comport with the pattern 
of privatization typically followed in 
the United States of retaining collective 
financing but delegating performance  
to the private sector. Across-the-board 
tax reduction and targeted tax incen-
tives advance different privatization 
goals, with very different political 
consequences.
The argument that targeted tax 
incentives are more like spending 
programs than across-the-board tax 
cuts is somewhat counterintuitive 
and has been controversial in both 
academic and political quarters. 
Regardless of whether that argument 
is accepted as a matter of theory, 
however, the characterization of tax 
provisions as revenue raisers or revenue 
losers provides useful information 
to legislators because taxing and 
spending decisions tend to be made 
incrementally, and by reference to a 
current budgetary or revenue baseline. 
Since enactment of the Congressional 
Budget Act of 1974, for example, 
Congress has required that a list of 
“tax expenditures” be included in the 
budget showing revenue losses from 
certain existing federal income tax 
incentives.
Tax incentives generally do not 
involve negotiated relationships 
between government and private 
contractors, but typically involve tax 
reporting to the Internal Revenue 
Service and oversight jurisdiction by the 
tax-writing committees. The delivery 
of subsidies through the tax system can 
mask governmental funding levels and 
allocations and obscure accountability 
for outcomes being funded. The use of 
tax incentives as an alternative to discre-
tionary spending by government serves 
privatization goals through their use of 
market incentives and private choice.
Targeted tax incentives encourage 
private businesses or individuals to 
engage in certain socially or economi-
cally favored activities. This type of 
“privatization” also involves a redrawing 
of lines between the public and private 
sectors, however, making public goals 
private interests by modifying market 
incentives. Privatization proponents 
tend to favor tax incentives as an 
alternative to government performance. 
Incentives use the tax system to 
stimulate private activity, a mechanism 
that permits the market to respond to 
individual preferences. Proponents tend 
to view the market as representing an 
aggregation of individual preferences 
and thus an effective and cost-efficient 
way of achieving goals. Under this view, 
public purposes would be well served 
by programs that permit the market 
to operate with as little government 
control as possible.
Critics of privatization tend to view 
public values as representing something 
other than the aggregation of individual 
preferences. They point out that the 
exercise of individual choice in the 
marketplace is quite different from 
collective choice exercised through 
political participation in the democratic 
process. The marketplace records indi-
vidual preferences through purchasing 
power. Its increased use for performance 
of collectively financed activities, critics 
argue, may result in a loss of political 
participation and deliberation as well as 
the loss of those choices made possible 
through government action.
Conclusion
In sum, although the Constitution 
links the taxing power with the power 
to spend for the “general welfare,” the 
courts have largely deferred to the 
political process for determination of 
the public purposes appropriate for 
congressional action. The political 
dynamics involve raw budgetary 
conflicts, contested ideas about the 
value of collective versus private choice, 
and deep differences in views about 
governmental competencies and func-
tions. Although the Court in the future 
may opt to enforce limits on Congress’s 
use of tax penalties or tax incentives 
for regulatory purposes, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Sebelius demon-
strates its current willingness to accord 
Congress a presumption of validity in 
the exercise of its taxing power.
Achieving greater political account-
ability for both the financing and 
performance of tax incentives remains 
a central challenge. Administrative 
lawyers and scholars are engaged in 
studying new ways in which regulation, 
contracts, and contract monitoring may 
respond to the accountability problems 
created by increased “contracting out” 
or privatization of government services. 
A parallel effort to study ways in which 
effective monitoring of tax incentives 
can be accomplished needs to be 
undertaken. 
